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Quantified Analysis of the Leakage of Confidential Data

Clark, David and Hunt, Sebastian and Malacaria, Pasquale (2002) Quantified Analysis of the Leakage of Confidential Data. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 59 (3). pp. 1-14.

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Abstract

Basic information theory is used to analyse the amount of confidential information which may be leaked by programs written in a very simple imperative language. In particular, a detailed analysis is given of the possible leakage due to equality tests and if statements. The analysis is presented as a set of syntax-directed inference rules and can readily be automated.

Item Type:Article
Subjects:UNSPECIFIED
ID Code:1106
Deposited By:Dr. David Clark
Deposited On:13 Nov 2007 16:42
Last Modified:13 Nov 2007 16:42

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